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ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Reply Brief is
limited in scope to matters raised by FNMA in its Appellate Brief. However, some of the
arguments and facts set forth in Jordan Construction’s principal Appellate Brief are
relevant and lend context to the arguments contained herein. Therefore, Jordan
Construction incorporates its principal Appellate Brief and the arguments made therein
herein by reference.
I. FNMA COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE OBJECTED TO THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION.
FNMA argues that the original Writ of Execution upon which Jordan Construction
attempted to execute should not have been issued in the first place and that FNMA should
not have been required to respond. However, all of that ignores the fact that FNMA was
on notice of the proceedings and had the entire court record available to it at all relevant
times. It could have and should have objected when the Writ of Execution was entered
because at that point it had an interest in the property and was on notice that there was a
mechanic’s lien claim pending that affected title to the property.
FNMA argues that the Writ of Execution would have only allowed Jordan
Construction to execute on its in personam judgment against Scott Bell, and that since
Scott Bell no longer owned the property, Scott Bell had no further interest to foreclose.
However, the Writ of Execution was intended to allow the foreclosure of the mechanic’s
lien from the very beginning. The property at issue was the very subject of the
mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim. Jordan Construction prevailed on its mechanic’s lien
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claim. The mechanic’s lien appeared in the chain of title along with a lis pendens. These
documents would not have appeared in the chain of title if the pending litigation did not
directly affect title to the property.
Jordan Construction could not have executed on its in personam judgment against
Scott Bell at that point in any event because Scott Bell had filed for bankruptcy and was
protected by the automatic stay. As a lien holder, FNMA (or its predecessor) knew or
should have known that. Jordan Construction had obtained permission from the
Bankruptcy Court to proceed against the property and foreclose its mechanic’s lien. That
permission was conveyed to the trial court in this case, and the foreclosure sale was
noticed. The sale of the property was always about the mechanic’s lien foreclosure, not
the in personam damages awarded to Jordan Construction on Jordan Construction’s other
claims. This was not a simple execution of a money judgment and never was.
FNMA could have and should have objected to the Writ of Execution at the time it
was issued and raised its concerns at that time. It knew or should have known that Jordan
Construction asserted a mechanic’s lien claim on the property. It knew or should have
known that Jordan Construction sought to foreclose the mechanic’s lien, and that Scott
Bell had filed for bankruptcy. Finally, FNMA knew or should have known that the Writ
of Execution was issued for purposes of facilitating a mechanic’s lien foreclosure sale. It
should have objected then, and asserted its rights. The trial court likely would have held
a hearing at which point the rights of the parties with respect to the property could have
been determined. Instead, FNMA did nothing, and waived its right to object. Even if
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FNMA believed that Jordan Construction sought only to enforce its in personam money
damages judgment, it nevertheless should have objected to preserve its property rights.
II.

THE LIS PENDENS NOTIFIED FNMA THAT ITS INTEREST IN
THE PROPERTY MAY BE AFFECTED BY LITIGATION
BETWEEN JORDAN CONSTRUCTION AND BELL. FNMA
COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE INTERVENED.

FNMA does not dispute that a lis pendens was recorded in the chain of title to the
Scott Bell home on December 15, 2008 (R. 2741), and that this same lis pendens
appeared in the chain of title to the home throughout this case, including at the time
FNMA purchased the home at the trustee’s sale. Nevertheless, FNMA continues to argue
that it is not bound by the judgment Jordan Construction obtained against Scott Bell in
spite of the lis pendens. This argument ignores the fact that if FNMA had concerns about
how Scott Bell was defending the case, it could have and should have intervened to
protect its interest.
This Court has held that the purchaser of real property that is subject to a lis
pendens acquires the property subject to the outcome of the litigation. “The recording of
a lis pendens provides constructive notice to all persons that the rights and interests in the
property at issue are controverted. One who purchases property subject to a lis pendens
acquires only the grantor’s interest therein, as determined by the outcome of the
litigation.” Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 2006) (citing Hidden Meadows
Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). If a purchaser does not feel that its interest
is being adequately protected, it may intervene in accordance with Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 24(a) provides that “anyone shall be permitted to
4

intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest. . .”
Further, “[t]he recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons that
any rights or interests they may acquire . . . are subject to the judgment or decree. One
who acquires an interest in land that is the subject of the pending litigation . . . is
charged with notice of the claimed contrary rights of others, and he is bound by the
judgment rendered in the litigation.” Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914
(Utah 1978). They either accept the results, or intervene because their interests are not
being adequately protected.
Because a lis pendens appeared in the chain of title to the property at the time
FNMA purchased it, FNMA is charged with notice of the pending litigation, and is bound
by the judgment rendered in the litigation. Id. Any other result is contrary to the very
purpose of a lis pendens. The trial court failed to properly recognize that FNMA is bound
by the judgment against Scott Bell insofar as it applies to the property in question. (R.
3206). This Court should reverse the trial court and declare that FNMA is in fact bound
by the judgment Jordan Construction obtained against Scott Bell and direct the lower
court to enforce the judgment against FNMA allowing Jordan Construction to foreclose
its mechanic’s lien.
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III.

SCOTT BELL AND FNMA WERE IN PRIVITY WITH EACH
OTHER AT THE TIME OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST SCOTT
BELL

FNMA argues that FNMA did not have the same interest in the property as Scott
Bell, and that therefore there is no privity required for Res Judicata. However, FNMA
ignores the fact that after FNMA purchased the property at the Trustee’s Sale, it held the
exact same right to the property that Scott Bell held before he ever executed the Trust
Deed.
Mechanic’s liens relate back to the date on which work was first commenced.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (2008). In this case that was October 15, 2006. Scott Bell had a
full 100% unencumbered interest in the property until that time. After October 15, 2006,
the mechanic’s lien attached to the entire interest held by Scott Bell at that time, and
Scott Bell held an interest encumbered only by the mechanic’s lien. As of that date, the
Trust Deed had not yet been recorded. The Trust Deed was recorded on February 1, 2008.
At that point, Scott Bell granted certain property rights to his long-term financing lender
(i.e., the right to sell the property to recover the balance of the loan in the event of
nonpayment). Those rights were taken by the lender subject to and inferior to the already
attached mechanic’s lien. This is because the Mechanic’s Lien had already previously
attached as of the date work first commenced (October 15, 2006), even though it had not
yet been recorded. At the Trust Deed foreclosure sale, the rights granted to the lender
were reunited with the possessory rights Bell had continued to possess before the sale.
Once again, all rights in the property were reunited, save Jordan Construction’s
mechanic’s lien interest, just as they had been immediately before Bell had conveyed the
6

Trust Deed to his lender. Therefore, FNMA held the exact same interest that Scott Bell
held at the time the mechanic’s lien attached, but before executing the original Trust
Deed. That is, a 100% interest encumbered only by the mechanic’s lien.
This Court “has defined the word ‘privity’ as a ‘mutual or successive relationship
to the same right or property.” Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 1943). “As
applied to judgments or decrees of courts, the word means one whose interest has been
legally represented at the time.” Id. (citation omitted). As illustrated above, after the
foreclosure sale, FNMA had the exact same rights in the property as Scott Bell had after
the mechanic’s lien had attached but before the Trust Deed was recorded. Thus, FNMA
took the property subject to the outcome of the litigation between Jordan Construction
and Scott Bell insofar as it related to the property, and the trial court should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING JORDAN
CONSTRUCTION’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS FINAL FOR RES JUDICATA PURPOSES.

Utah courts have made clear that summary judgment, for res judicata purposes,
satisfies the final judgment on the merits requirement. See e.g. Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp. v.
Int’l & Dev. Corp., 1999 UT App. 232, ¶ 16, 986 P.2d 765 (“Summary judgment on the
Separation Agreement claims constituted a judgment on the merits which became final
upon entry of the Final Order.”). There is no requirement that the summary judgment
order be certified pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
confirms judgments as final for purposes of appeal. The two concepts are not necessarily
tied together.
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It is true that all issues and all claims between Jordan Construction and Scott Bell
had not been resolved with the trial court’s order on summary judgment. However, that
does not necessarily mean that the issues and claims disposed of by the summary
judgment motion were not final for purposes of Res Judicata. Rule 54 certification and
Res Judicata are two completely unrelated concepts. Rule 54 certification signals that all
claims between parties have been resolved and that the case is ripe for appeal. Res
Judicata does not require such a certification and can be applied absent any sort of Rule
54 finality.
In this case, the trial court decided all issues relating to the property between
Jordan Construction and Scott Bell in Jordan Construction’s favor in all respects,
including on its mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim. (R. 0529). This was final. The trial
court subsequently entered a final modified Order regarding those issues on August 3,
2011, conclusively determining all issues contained therein. (R. 0888). The fact that there
were still issues outstanding relating to Scott Bell’s personal claims against Jordan
Construction is irrelevant. Therefore, res judicata should have been applied to prevent relitigation of the issues and the trial court should be reversed.
V. THE 2 TON PLUMBING CASE CITED BY FNMA IS INAPPOSITE ON
THE ISSUES OF INTEREST OR AMENDMENT.
In its brief, FNMA cites 2 Ton Plumbing, LLC v. Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29, 345
P.3d 675 in support of its position that Jordan Construction should not be permitted to
recover interest on its mechanic’s lien claim. FNMA appears to take the position that
under 2 Ton Plumbing, interest was not allowed to be awarded on mechanic’s lien claims
8

At first blush, the 2 Ton Plumbing case and this case appear to be remarkably similar
factually. However, the facts of the 2 Ton Plumbing case are distinguishable in critical
ways, and the issues to be considered are not the same. In 2 Ton Plumbing, the contractor
asserting the mechanic’s lien attempted to amend the lien to increase the principal
amount of the lien in order to unilaterally add attorney fees and interest to its original lien
amount. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that these amendments were not permissible
because interest and attorney fees are not proper components of the amount appearing on
the face of the lien. Id. Jordan Construction takes no issue with that conclusion and has
made no attempt to increase the amount on the face of its lien to include attorney fees and
interest.
Critically, the Supreme Court did not opine as to whether interest was allowed at
all on a mechanic’s lien claim (as FNMA seems to assert), nor whether a mechanic’s lien
may be amended at all. That is not the situation in this case, and there is no Utah case that
directly answers either question. In this case, the lien was amended to add principal
amounts that were discovered after the original lien had been filed because the facts had
been concealed by Scott Bell. Jordan Construction did not seek to add interest to the
amount appearing on the face of the lien. Rather, Jordan Construction’s interest claim has
nothing to do with mechanic’s lien law per se. Rather, it is based upon its forbearance of
money and the calculable certainty of the amount of damages.
Interest is routinely awarded in Utah cases where damage amounts can be
calculated, regardless of the type of case. This includes mechanic’s lien cases. See, e.g.,
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). “[T]he interest issue is injected by law into
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every action for the payment of past due money.” Id. at 809. In addition, prejudgment
interest is appropriate “when the loss has been fixed as of a definite time and the amount
of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with wellestablished rules of damages.” Iron Head Constr., Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ¶ 11, 207
P.3d 1231 (internal citation omitted). A mechanic’s lien claim is one that necessarily
arises from contract and the payment of past due money, and fits squarely within the
holding of Lignell and Utah Code Ann. 15-1-1. Prejudgment interest at the statutory rate
should have been awarded by the trial court.
In 2012, the Utah Legislature codified the ruling in Lignell, and specifically
applied the Section 15-1-1 interest rate to all mechanic’s lien claims. Utah Code Ann. §
38-1a-309. Simply because it was not previously codified does not mean that interest was
not allowed at all. There were other sources of law on the matter that should have been
applied. Therefore, Jordan Construction is entitled to recover pre-judgment interest at the
rate of 10% per annum from the time the money was first due until judgment is awarded.
The trial court’s ruling should be reversed and this Court should remand for a
determination of the amount of interest to which Jordan Construction is entitled.
VI.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT JORDAN
CONSTRUCTION’S SECOND AMENDED MECHANIC’S LIEN WAS
UNTIMELY
The trial court erred in holding that Jordan Construction’s Second Amended
Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was untimely and therefore invalid. It is clear and undisputed
that the original notice of lien (and the first amendment thereto) was timely recorded
under the provisions of the 2008 version of Utah’s mechanic’s lien statutes. The parties
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have argued, however, over whether the second amendment to the mechanic’s lien was
timely.
There has likewise been some wrangling related to that issue over whether Jordan
Construction should have been permitted to amend its response to a request for admission
wherein it admitted that a certificate of occupancy had been issued in October 2008. That
argument is adequately briefed in Jordan Construction’s principal brief and is not
belabored here. However, it would not be necessary for the Court to reach that question at
all if the Court applies principles of equitable tolling.
FNMA argues that neither the equitable discovery rule nor the relation back
doctrine should be applied to rescue Jordan Construction’s arguably untimely second
amended lien. Some underlying factual context is helpful to understanding why FNMA’s
argument on this point should be disregarded. The undisputed fact is that the Second
Amended Lien that is at issue had already appeared in the chain of title to the property
long before FNMA ever obtained the Trust Deed or purchased the property at the
trustee’s sale. The amendment did not catch FNMA by surprise, and did not prejudice
FNMA in any way. Scott Bell, the party the timeliness of the filing affected most, and
who was in the best position to assert the defense made no objection and did not raise the
defense at all. By the time FNMA purchased the property, the original mechanic’s lien
and the two amendments had long appeared in the chain of title.
Both equitable discovery principles and the relation back doctrine should be
applied in this case to further their exact purposes and to avoid an unjust result.
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A. The Principles Governing the Equitable Discovery Rule for Reviving
Claims Should Apply Equally in this Case
While the equitable discovery rule has traditionally been applied to revive claims
made in litigation brought after the applicable statute of limitations has run, the rationale
is the same and the same principles should govern. The fact is that Scott Bell through his
fraud and deception hid the facts from Jordan Construction. Jordan Construction did
everything it could possibly do to discover the full extent of the damages as quickly as it
possibly could. This case does not present a situation in which FNMA believed it was
free from any liability due to the passage of time. Both the original lien and the amended
liens appeared in the chain of title before FNMA ever became involved. In fact,
judgment had been awarded to Jordan Construction permitting Jordan Construction to
recover on the second amended lien before FNMA ever became involved. Scott Bell did
not object to the Second Amended Lien, and did not raise a defense on those grounds.
FNMA is simply attempting to take advantage of an unfortunate situation caused by Scott
Bell that was entirely out of Jordan Construction’s control. This is the exact type of
injustice that the equitable discovery rule was intended to alleviate. Even if the Second
Amended Notice of Mechanic’s Lien was brought outside the applicable limitations
period, it should be revived by the Equitable Discovery Rule.
B. The Relation Back Doctrine Should be Applied.
Even if the trial court was correct in refusing to consider the actual certificate of
occupancy and rely only on Jordan Construction’s admission, the trial court should have
applied the relation back doctrine to allow the amended lien to be enforced. Although an
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amended notice of lien is not exactly the same as an amended pleading in litigation, the
rationale in favor of applying the doctrine is the same and should be applied in this case
to reach an equitable result.
“Utah’s relation back doctrine developed out of the common law under which a
party could correct a clerical error without bringing a new action where the real parties
were involved unofficially all along.” Gary Porter Const. v. Fox Const., Inc., 2004 UT
App 354, ¶ 32, 1010 P.3d 371. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also
addresses relation back of amendments. “Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the original pleading.” Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). This includes amendments to increase
the amount of damages sought, which is what Jordan Construction did in this case.
In this case, FNMA had actual notice of the amended notice of mechanic’s lien
because the amended notice of mechanic’s lien appeared in the chain of title long before
FNMA ever acquired the trust deed or the property itself. (R. 3947) (Addendum 3 –
Second Amended Lien). FNMA cannot reasonably argue that it did not have notice of
Jordan Construction’s claim. There is no compelling reason that the amendment should
not be permitted in this case given the circumstances of this case. Additionally, the
second amended notice of mechanic’s lien arose from the same transaction and set of
facts as the original notice of lien. In arguing that the second amended notice of lien was
untimely, FNMA simply took advantage of Scott Bell’s fraud and concealment.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment should be reversed.
DATED this 20th day of December, 2016.
_________________________________
Jeffery J. Owens
Attorney for Jordan Construction, Inc.
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